

NAPLES, 1629: BUREAUCRACY, WAR FINANCE AND THE “RENAISSANCE STATE”

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ABSTRACT

This essay examines the financial situation of the Kingdom of Naples in 1629 through an analysis of the state budget for that year. It details the difficult condition of the exchequer in Naples on the cusp of the economic crisis of the seventeenth century and of the all-consuming hostilities of the Thirty Years' War. It highlights the idiosyncratic link between bureaucracy and war finance in Naples and shows that strong elements of tradition and innovation were tightly entwined in the workings of the “Renaissance state”.

Budgets, Bureaucrats and Armies in the Making of the “Renaissance State”

In the Kingdom of Naples, as in other areas of Europe which saw the emergence in the early modern age (ca. 1300-1750) of what Eugene Rice has called “the sovereign territorial state,” a budget of income and expense could be a powerful weapon in the armor of princes.¹ At least in theory, budgets provided a gauge by which rulers could take vision of the resources and needs of their realm and operate strategic choices to augment the former, fulfill the latter, and expand their authority and control.

In this view of things, budgets were essential tools of the growing early modern state, an integral part of its basic triune structure, from which they sprang and which they served—an army suited to fight the king's wars, a fiscal organization intended to secure the resources to finance that army, and a bureaucratic structure intent, among other things, on administering the funds to run the army.

This may be the most optimistic of views, a sort of continental Whig interpretation, for it posits a ruler in control of the state, an army dedicated to the maintenance and expansion of royal authority, a viable fiscal organization, and a bureaucracy intent on furthering the royal will. Such a view leaves perhaps little room for the compromises and compacts that even “absolute” rulers had to strike with powerful elements of their society so as to be able to exercise their authority. Nor does it allow for the discontent of unpaid, raggedy armies bent on mutiny, or for the assertiveness, if not the outright obstructionism which bureaucracies not infrequently presented to their liege sovereigns.²

Yet it was precisely that assertiveness, and the esprit de corps which produced it, that the great Italian historian Federico Chabod identified as one of the crucial distinguishing features of the “Renaissance state.” “We have only such wages for our offices as we deserve,” Chabod paraphrased Milanese officials addressing the governor of Milan in 1544, as they refused to give up part of their salaries to make up a budget shortfall.

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...[Those wages] are not a bounty from His Majesty [Charles V]. If His Majesty and His Excellency the Governor are not satisfied with us and our work, our offices should be given to others. But so long as we hold them, we are receiving no more than what is due us.³

For Chabod the words of the Milanese officials signified the emergence of a new professionalism and, more important yet, a new, abstract notion of the State.⁴ The Milanese officials, Chabod in fact argued, had “a conception of the State and of their own function that [was] already quite distinct;”⁵ their loyalty was not a question of “personal fidelity” to the ruler, but of devotion to the abstraction that was the State. In that lay much of the “modernity” of the “Renaissance state.”⁶

The house of bureaucracy, of course, had many mansions, and in Naples as in Milan, in areas of Spanish hegemony and not, the bureaucratic spirit spoke with many voices. Nine years after the Milanese officials had refused to give up part of their salaries, their counterparts in Naples struck a different note. “Most Sacred, Imperial and Catholic Majesty, after kissing Your Imperial hands,” began a cover letter which the members of Naples’ highest financial organ, the *Sommaria*, sent to Charles V to accompany the Treasurer General’s account books for 1552, as they had been requested to do.⁷ The magistrates went on to explain the procedure used in the Treasurer’s records and to account for the delay in fulfilling the royal request, and they did so respectfully but quite matter of factly. In the conclusion, however, they returned to the reverential tone of the opening:

And we commend ourselves very humbly to Your Majesty’s grace, always praying our Lord God for the health and prosperity of Your Majesty....,

and they signed themselves

Your Most Sacred, Imperial and Catholic Majesty’s humble servants and vassals, who kiss the Imperial hands...⁸

The *Sommaria* leadership was not alone in employing sacral tones in letters to the King.⁹ Epistolary formulas, not to mention the rules of etiquette in an age as conscious of, and as attentive to, rank and hierarchy as the sixteenth century dictated such words, which harked back so deliberately to the act of homage paid by vassals to liege lord. But the formulaic language was not an empty shell: it resonated with and it reflected the strength of allegiance and the depth of devotion of men who saw themselves as faithful servants of a Universal Monarchy headed by a divinely-ordained Emperor. That devotion and that allegiance may well have been at once expressions of “personal fidelity” to liege lord and of abstract devotion to the State and its Sovereign.

Those sentiments were deeply entangled and, if circumstances demanded, royal officials in Naples could combine a sense of the high dignity of their office, as stewards of the King’s domain, with a deeply-ingrained corporate spirit. The *Sommaria* staff accountants, for example, had occasion to do so in 1562, when they penned an impassioned

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request to the King that their salaries be raised from the 150 ducats at which they had been set in 1528 to 300, just to keep up with the cost of living.¹⁰ By the end of the century, the *Sommaria* accountants were earning 400 ducats a year, but theirs must have been small consolation: in actual fact, officials' salaries in the Kingdom remained well below inflation for most of the period 1550-1638.¹¹

A corporate spirit, as we have just seen, could go hand in hand with deep personal loyalty to the sovereign and a high sense of office. It could easily degenerate as well into behavior not quite as edifying. Porters were almost routinely seen delivering “cheeses, hams and things to eat” (“quesos, presutos y cosas de comer”) at the houses of officials, their masters no doubt attempting to curry favor by initiating an exchange of “gifts.”¹² Not hams or cheeses, but game birds, scores of them, no less, were once delivered as gratuity to the home of Antonio Orefice, a top judicial officer.¹³ Against of course all rules of good conduct, in the 1550s Francesco Reverter, the very head of the *Sommaria* and so the man most intimately connected with running the exchequer in Naples, was profiteering from grain speculation with Genoese businessmen and merchant-bankers.¹⁴

Then, too, some of the King's servants had a rather flexible view of their work obligations and went to work when and as they pleased. Of Vincenzo Antonio Nastaro, an official in the *Vicaria*, Naples' central law magistracy, it was said that

... at times, but rarely, he'd show up to work early in the morning, but [usually] he'd come very late, after the first two or three hours of the morning shift had gone by. Then for the afternoon shift, in winter he'd show up between 2:00 and 4:00 o'clock... and he'd leave between 6:00 and 7:00 o'clock or so...¹⁵

For many of His Majesty's subjects, Nastaro's idiosyncratic work hours meant time and effort needlessly wasted:

...because he came to work so late...very often, sadly, many people from out of town who needed his seal on their documents, seeing that he hadn't arrived yet...would ask where he lived...¹⁶

Given directions, they would obligingly go look for Nastaro at his residence, but

...since he wouldn't be there, they'd have to come back to the office and wait for him...and so the said Vincenzo Antonio would wind up putting his seals on said documents in the presence of very huge crowds...and for the afore-said reason the said poor people from out of town and the merchants could not get their business expedited in good time...¹⁷

Other royal servants, like Jacopo Terracina, a provisioning officer in the city of Naples who gave audience to petitioners in his house, acted as sovereigns over their little courts and their courtiers.¹⁸ Others still left a great deal to be desired in what might be termed the essential qualifications of any accounting office. “Antonio Ametrano, the official in

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charge of contraband,” a seventeenth-century document lamely informs us, “does not know how to read and write, and he signs documents with a stamp... ”¹⁹

Perhaps most damning of all, from the point of view of the actual drawing up of budgets and fiscal accounts, are the accusations of frauds allegedly perpetrated by magistrates at all levels of fiscal administration, from the center in Naples to the local level, in the provinces of the Kingdom. If one is to believe those charges against officials high and low, and the investigations of those charges by auditors sent expressly from Spain, such errant behavior would seem to have amounted to a wholesale plunder of royal resources. According to a scathing indictment of such legerdemain, dating from the early seventeenth century,

... a budget was drawn up in 1608, when the Lord Count of Benavente was Viceroy, and it was signed by the entire Council of Finance [the *Sommaria*]. It showed a deficit of one million five-hundred ninety-five thousand ducats a year, and it was sent to His Majesty...²⁰

That was an enormous amount of money, corresponding to nearly half all state income for 1600 or 1605, and over a third of expense for those same years.²¹ Then, the document goes on to say,

...when the Lord Count of Lemos came to this Kingdom and asked for a new budget, he was given one by the very *Sommaria* that showed a deficit of 558,000 ducats a year. His Excellency [the Viceroy] sought information, and found out that it [the budget] listed false expenses to the tune of about 500,000 ducats...²²

It is, of course, very difficult to assess the extent of corruption in early modern government, in Naples as elsewhere. To judge not just from the few examples offered above, but also from the efforts made by governments everywhere to discourage or repress it, even if by “moral[izing]” it, as Jean-Claude Waquet has suggested, it must have been rampant in the bureaucracies of Europe.²³ If the energy devoted to the “visitation” of public officials by royal auditors, the lengthy dossiers of charges, the secret testimony by witnesses, are any guide, malfeasance and corruption proved also quite resistant to suppression. In actual fact and for many reasons, the state itself may have been complicit in its persistence: “[d]espite the rigour applied by the law,” Waquet writes, “an underlying permissiveness gradually enlarged the circle of justifiable acts.”²⁴

Such considerations would seem to impose severe limitations on the use of quantitative documents that may well have been manipulated for purposes of privateering and illicit gain. Yet there is no obvious need to discard budgets and fiscal reports, states of the exchequer and financial accounts, or, quite simply, quantitative documents, dubbing them mere “social constructions of reality” because of the possibility of errors or fraud. In reality, *all* documents, of whatever type, reflect and embody “social constructions of reality.” But there were objective, strategic realities and needs which budgets met and

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fulfilled, as did the armies, the bureaucrats, the tax officials who constructed or gave rise to those documents. Focusing on those strategic realities restores the usefulness of those sources as it underlines the priorities and the goals they exemplify.


The Budget for 1629

A case in point is the budget for the Kingdom of Naples for 1629.²⁵ This text is, first of all, a good example of the feedback mechanism between “the court and the country,” that is, the capital city of Naples and the twelve provinces of the Neapolitan Kingdom in the early modern age. Given the geopolitical realities of early modern Italy, that is, the subjugation of most of the Italian peninsula to the Spanish Monarchy until the early eighteenth century, the text is also a good example of the feedback mechanism between the court in Spain and the country in Naples, between the largest imperial power in the world early in the seventeenth century and its most important possession in Italy. It is, too, a valuable indicator of economic conditions in the Kingdom in an age of widespread crisis and change, and of the heavy demands placed on a colonial dependency by a superpower involved in raging warfare. It is also, not least, a telling illustration of the priorities set and the goals pursued by an early modern fiscal system.

The immediate geopolitical context of the 1629 text is the warfare in the battlefields of Northern and Central Europe as the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) reached a most ruinous and costly phase, straining the resources of much of Catholic and Protestant Europe alike. The Kingdom of Naples bore its part of the cost of that warfare, aiding Spain with money, men and arms for the war theaters and for the defense of Spain’s northernmost Italian holding, the state of Milan.²⁶


Though the 1630s and the 1640s were the decades in which war taxation fell on Naples most harshly, the budget for 1629 highlights the difficult conditions of the exche-

The Structure of Income, 1629



quer in Naples as the second decade of the new century was winding down. On that score, it takes its place in a long line of fiscal records, ever since their inception as simple reports in the early sixteenth century, that had painted Naples' finances in dramatic hues.²⁷

The Structure of Expense, 1629



Total: 4,553,104 ducats

The budget registers income for 4,371,392 ducats and expenses for 4,553,104 ducats, with a shortfall amounting to 181,713 ducats.²⁸ Both the income and the expense side of the ledger can be succinctly represented as in Figures I and II.

On the income side of the ledger, as Figure I clearly shows, direct taxes amounted to 2,300,623 ducats, or 53% of all receipts; indirect taxes, to 1,546,588 ducats, or 35% of the total. The revenue from the Sheep Customhouse in Foggia, which included the tolls on transhumance and the rental of agricultural lands in Puglia, accounted for 303,388 ducats, or 7% of receipts. Other sources of revenue, ranging variously from the duties on baronial succession to the proceeds from the administration of justice, the fines levied on contraband, the sale of offices and the disposal of "[old and] useless" slaves, amounted to 220,792 ducats, or 5% of the total.

On the other side of the ledger, military expenditures amounted to 1,014,339 ducats, or 22% of outlays, and payments on the public debt to 2,605,773 ducats, or about 57% of the total. Civil expenses, that is, largely, the salaries of officials in the Kingdom, amounted to 403,391 ducats, or 9% of expense. Grants and aids to royal pensioners took up instead 295,835 ducats, or 6% of the total, and the outlay for the construction and upkeep (such as it was) of the Kingdom's roads, fortresses, castles and coastal watchtowers was the last (and least) significant expense, reaching only 202,906 ducats, or 4% of the total.²⁹

Arid as they might be, the budget figures serve to underscore the major features of fiscal life in early modern Naples and to highlight the fiscal priorities set for the King-

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dom. Direct and indirect taxation, as is clear, formed the lion's share of the Crown's receipts (88% of all income), while the combined expenses for the military and for the public debt held first rank in outlays (79% of the total).

The fiscal system in Naples, then, was solidly anchored on direct taxation (53% of receipts) and heavily propped up by indirect levies (35% of receipts). In turn, it was geared to supporting a military-financial complex that took up nearly four-fifths of all expenses (4,029,976 ducats) and more than the combined receipts for direct and indirect taxation together (4,007,146 ducats).

As had consistently been the case ever since the late sixteenth century, military expenses for 1629, though quite substantial, were dwarfed by the payments for the public debt, which amounted to more than twice the level of military outlays and well over half the year's total operating costs. Such a state of affairs is a clear reflection of Spain's changing geopolitical concerns and of Naples' own role within them. With war raging in the Netherlands and Central Europe, and Spain taken up by its far-flung continental ventures, Naples was the chief financial and supply base for Spanish efforts in both Northern Italy and Northern/Central Europe. Public debt expenses, then, represented payments on the indebtedness which the Kingdom incurred in support of the Spanish Crown; they were part and parcel of the military-financial obligations that tied Naples to Spain.

Military expenditures, of course, had always figured prominently in the Kingdom's budgets and fiscal reports. Indeed, military needs and the shortfall of ready cash for those needs had been a key impulse in the emergence of such documents in early modern times.³⁰ Then, too, the growth of a consolidated debt had been one of the great fiscal novelties of sixteenth-century Naples, and it had played a positive role for at least part of that century. But the huge increases in the levels of both military expenses and, especially, outlays for the public debt ever since the late sixteenth century, were clearly not grounded in economic reality.

For one thing, as Giuseppe Galasso has cogently argued, a capital indebtedness of over forty million ducats, such as is represented by the figures for public debt expenses for the mid- to late-1620s, capitalized at 7%, could not be said to bear much relation to the Kingdom's productive capacities in the new, harsher economic climate of the early seventeenth century.³¹ That growth in indebtedness coincided in fact with the downward economic conjuncture in Southern Italy. It thus exacerbated the economic and social imbalances of the region, dampening investment and enterprise in general and accentuating the misery of countless numbers of its subjects.

A reflection of the darkening economic picture in 1629 can be easily gleaned from some entries for indirect taxes in the text. Attached to the budget, in fact, is a summary report comparing revenues and expenses between 1628 and 1629. The accountants wanted to show in a quick and accessible manner whether, and how, a given source of income, or category of expense, had fared in the two years: whether it had increased, decreased, or remained stationary. Particularly troublesome must have been the data for some important sources of revenue like the Sheep Customs and two of the gabelles whose leases had to be renewed between 1628 and 1629.³² The proceeds from the Sheep Customs (i.e.,

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the transhumance tolls and the rental of agricultural land in Puglia) in 1629 had amounted to 303,388 ducats, or nearly 10,000 ducats less than for 1628, about 18,000 less than in 1626 and a staggering 71,000 ducats less than for 1600.³³ The Silk and Saffron gabelle, which had yielded 301,055 ducats a year in the lease period ending in 1628, could be farmed out for only 267,720 ducats a year with the new lease starting in 1629.³⁴ More troubling yet was the fate of the Naples Customhouse, the largest and most profitable in the Kingdom (the *Regia Dogana di Napoli*). There the decline in the lease offer had amounted to no less than 67,000 ducats between 1628 and 1629, from 250,000 to 183,000 ducats.³⁵

The three sources of revenue here considered, then, yielded over 100,000 ducats less between 1628 and 1629, not an inconsiderable sum, especially to an exchequer as impecunious and as burdened with war aids as was Naples' in the later years of the 1620s. Given the way in which funds for war aids were raised in the Kingdom's securities market, however, the loss was more than ten times greater, for it represented a capital indebtedness theoretically amounting to over 1,420,000 ducats.³⁶

By contrast, the year's deficit in 1629 was almost 28,000 ducats higher than for 1628 (181,713 vs. 153,852 ducats). Not only that—the largest increases by far in income between 1628 and 1629, for their part, were due to contingency or to reasons that, if they touched on economic matters, did so in an ambivalent manner. The increase in revenue from 1628 to 1629, in fact, amounted to 132,526 ducats.³⁷ Of that, 55,813 ducats' worth (from 6,562 [1628] to 62,376 ducats [1629]) was due to the devolution of the city of San Marco, in the feudal state of Bisignano, at the death of its lord, the Duchess of Gravina. That had been a windfall for the royal exchequer, but it had been also purely a matter of contingency and happenstance.³⁸ The far larger increase, 76,712 ducats' worth (from 46,063 [1628] to 122,775 ducats [1629]) issued from licenses granted for the export from the Kingdom of wine, dried fruit, wood and other agricultural products (*tratte*).³⁹ This fact does attest to a demand for the Kingdom's products abroad, and to agricultural activity at home to sustain that demand, but it does so with an ironic twist. The increase, the budget in fact reports, "has been due to the many export licenses for various foodstuffs and other items (*vittovaglie*) granted in said year for the state of Milan and for Genova...".⁴⁰ The exports of course yielded a bonanza for the Treasury, but they did so, ironically, in the very name of the warfare in the North that had borne down on Naples and its subjects and that was to continue doing so well into the future.

Considerations such as these speak clearly of the economic difficulties that the Kingdom of Naples was encountering by the late 1620s, and of the bond of colonial dependency that Spanish rule had come to mean for the Southern kingdom. A look at the other major categories of expense for 1629 can be equally instructive, though of different matters.

Outlays for all purposes but the military and the public debt amounted only to a little over 930,000 (932,092) ducats, or about 20% of total expenditures. As we have seen, they were made up in large part of payments to pensioners (295,835 ducats, or 6% of expenditure), of civil expenses, largely the salaries for the officials in the Kingdom's bureaucracy (403,391 ducats, or 9%), and of the outlays for the maintenance and up-

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
keep of the Kingdom’s defense and communication infrastructure (roads, fortresses and coastal watchtowers, 202,906 ducats, or 4%).

What is most notable about these items is the sense of social, economic and political priorities they highlight. The very existence in the budget of a rubric for pensions is emblematic in this regard. To tell the truth, pensions did include some measure of compensation for old and disabled former military personnel, and so provided a highly selective and exiguous measure of social security. For the most part, however, this rubric consisted of prebends showered on the wealthy.

To a modern-day observer, perhaps, outlays like civil expenses and the expenditures for roads, fortresses and watchtowers might seem much closer properly to serving the Kingdom’s own needs than, say, pensions, or, for that matter, the military, and, even more, the bloated public debt. Yet they resolutely fell by the wayside: only pensions kept up with inflation, and handsomely so, in 1629, and at most times since the mid-sixteenth century. Civil expenses and the outlays for roads, fortresses and towers, on the other hand, trailed well behind the price curve.⁴¹ That state of affairs reflects at once the old-regime quality of the Neapolitan fiscal system and the toll exacted by war finance on the Kingdom’s own interests.

Despite all that, the years after 1629 were to register massive expenses for the military-financial complex and record-high levels of indebtedness. Between 1631 and 1637, for example, the Kingdom provided 48,000 soldiers, 5,500 horses, and (depending on the source used) 2,622,997 or 3,500,000 ducats for the defense of Milan.⁴² But that was only the beginning. As Figure III shows, much worse was yet to come in the later 1630s and the 1640s.

Loans for the Defense of Milan 1631-1643



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Between 1631 and 1643, nearly eleven million ducats in aid were sent from Naples to Milan, with the later 1630s and the early 1640s witnessing a dramatic increase in such remittances.⁴³ The average sum rose from 374,714 ducats a year between 1631-1637 to no less than 1,383,667 ducats a year between 1638-1643.⁴⁴ Between 1631 and 1637, the highest loans amounted to about 500,000 ducats; between 1638 and 1643, to over one million ducats; in 1643 alone, to nearly two and one-half million ducats. Otherwise put, in the five years alone between 1638 and 1643, Naples provided over three times as much as in the preceding seven years (1631-1637), or 8,302,000 ducats, and that in money alone. Those funds were raised by all-consuming, ruinous loans, guaranteed by the crippling number of imposts, new and old, "ordinary" and "extraordinary." Between 1622 and 1644, the amount extracted from Naples for the North in money alone amounted to over 33,000,000 ducats.⁴⁵

The Enduring Deficit

The budget for 1629, as we saw above, closed with a deficit of 181,713 ducats, a substantial sum, to be sure, but still only about four percent of income or of expenses. Much more troubling than the year's operating deficit was the last notation in the document, an almost casual statement from the *Sommaria* signatories to the effect that monies due for payments on the consolidated debt, for pensions, as well as for "the cavalry, the infantry and the galleys...for all of said year 1629 are estimated to amount to about six million two-hundred fifty thousand ducats," no less.⁴⁶

Similarly dire notices, it is quite true, had appeared at the end of most budgets sent to Spain from the very inception of the bureaucratic process of accounting and control in the Kingdom of Naples.⁴⁷ Then, too, the exchequer in Naples had been operating on a deficit as far back as the first fiscal accounts drawn up in the Kingdom for the Spanish overlords. Neither the year's operating shortfall nor the huge burden of unpaid arrears mentioned in the 1629 record, then, was in and by itself anomalous. And even more ominous tones would color the *Sommaria's* reports to Spain in the 1630s.⁴⁸

What gave the 1629 budget special poignancy, however, was the fact that it reflected a fiscal reality that was becoming increasingly hard to discount as the 1620s gave way to what were to be the ruinous 1630s. For many decades, in fact, growing amounts of taxes assessed in the Kingdom could simply not be collected. From the mid-1580s to the late 1620s and beyond, those sums rose considerably. Uncollected revenue in fact rose from 1,383,620 ducats for the period 1564-1584 (21 years) to 11,059,013 ducats for 1585-1623 (39 years) to 11,441,801 ducats for the *eight* years between 1624 and 1631,⁴⁹ or, in a rough and ready measure, from 65,887 ducats a year in the first period to 283,564 ducats a year in the second and no less than 1,430,225 ducats a year in the third. In the budget for 1636, that sum had grown even more, to 1,821,531 ducats!⁵⁰

Contemporaries like the signatories of the 1629 budget could not, of course, help noticing the growing amounts of uncollected and uncollectible revenue, and notices of increasing deficits appeared regularly in the various budgets and financial reports sub-

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mitted to King and Viceroy. But any remedy to the financial impasse in the Kingdom could, at best, be a procrustean one.

The “Renaissance State” in a Colonialist Context

In June, 1672, nearly forty years after the 1629 budget was drawn up, and a quarter century after the Thirty Years’ War had finally ended, yet another Spanish Viceroy in Naples, the Marquis of Astorga, had occasion to receive yet more “pressing” requests for aid from Madrid.⁵¹ To tell the truth, between November 18, 1653 and May 14, 1668, Naples had contributed 7,698,073 ducats for Spanish military and strategic needs outside the Kingdom and Italy.⁵² But already in the early 1670s all that must have seemed like ancient history. In September, 1671, in fact, Astorga was given explicit permission to raise money by

...undertaking and signing any capitulations, pacts and conventions, mortgaging and selling cities, lands, castles and other places, goods and duties of Our Royal Patrimony that We or Our Royal Chamber (the *Sommaria*) might be entitled to, or that might belong to us, with their jurisdictions and entitlements, or whatever type or quality, perpetually or for a limited time...⁵³

That permission amounted to the wholesale dismantling of what was left of the lands, titles and jurisdictions that the Crown had assembled in Naples ever since the fifteenth century. But even that was apparently not enough. In the name of the Queen-Regent, Marie Anne of Austria, a despatch dated 12 June 1672 stated that the authorities in Spain were well aware of the difficulties due to poor grain harvests, the “*falta y carestia de grano*,” in the Kingdom. Still, the note went on, the *Sommaria* was to work assiduously to raise loans for the needs of the Monarchy. The previous year’s loan, after all, was to have been for 450,000 ducats, but it had netted only 314,000. The new year’s was therefore to be for 656,200 ducats, that is, 520,000 for the current year’s remittance and 136,000 for the preceding year’s.⁵⁴

Another despatch dated the same day noted that “what is due [from Naples] for aids [to be sent] out of the Kingdom” amounted to 871,800 ducats and that the Viceroy apparently had only 312,067 ducats on hand to meet them; the year’s shortfall for those aids, therefore, seemed to amount to 559,733.⁵⁵ Careful administration, the missive blithely went on, could make up for the shortfall. In any case, the moneys were urgently required to support Spain’s cause in Milan and Catalonia:

...th[os]e funds simply cannot be done without, and they have to be right on time, without any delay, because of the serious inconveniences that would otherwise result...⁵⁶

Then, too, a message sent three days later continued, “...from here we can’t send anything, and if we could we wouldn’t fail to take care of so many different needs as we are forced to...”⁵⁷

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Less than two weeks afterwards, on June 27, 1672, an additional request came from Spain in the Queen-Regent's name. Though this one was not for money, it was an ironic reminder of the relationship of dependency that bound Naples to Spain. Silk, crystal and paint, no less, were requested to decorate the royal residence at Aranjuez, "...because we think that they can come more easily from said Kingdom..."⁵⁸

Another emblematic twist was to come in March 1679, one-hundred thirty-five years after the Milanese officials celebrated by Chabod for their "quite distinct...conception of the State and of their own function" and their refusal to make up a shortfall by foregoing a portion of their salaries. At the time, no funds could apparently be found in public coffers in Naples to repay a loan for a mere 12,506 ducats, a sum which had been borrowed in Palermo to assist with Spanish naval needs.⁵⁹

Unlike the Milanese civil servants in 1544, the Viceroy Marquis de Velez took on the debt as a personal liability, due and payable in four months.⁶⁰ Ironically, the previous year it had been none other than Neapolitan officials to urge the same course of action on the Viceroy with regard to the matter of 150,000 *reales* of eight, which had been assigned for collection on Naples, but which could not be paid from public funds.⁶¹

In light of Naples' experience, the Milanese refusal of 1544 seems less a marker of the "Renaissance state" than a statement of corporate prerogative, echoed by bureaucrats from one corner of Europe to the other across the early modern era. In Milan as in Naples and elsewhere, politics and bureaucracy in early modern times "operated against a discreet backcloth of traditional thought," and new forms of political practice often went hand in hand with the recrudescence of old ones.⁶² In Naples, the cost of ruinous warfare ever since the sixteenth century had gone a long way towards compromising the achievements and the integrity of the territorial state, "modern" and not, which had been forged in the Kingdom in the fifteenth century; it compromised as well what "abstract" conception of the state royal officials may have had there. Old and new attitudes of loyalty to the Crown and devotion to the ruler still mingled, entangling a newer, "distinct" conception of politics and the state with a time-honored sense of personal homage and fealty to liege lord.⁶³

Abbreviations

AGS	Archivo General, Simancas
ASN	Archivio di Stato, Naples
BCR	Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome
BLL	British Library, London
BNN	Biblioteca Nazionale, Naples
BPUG	Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, Geneva
IVdJ	Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan, Madrid
exp.	expediente
f., ff.	folio, folios
leg.	legajo

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Notes

1. Eugene F. Rice, Jr., *The Foundation of Early Modern Europe 1460-1559* (New York: Norton & Company, 1970), ch. 4. Rice uses the terms “sovereign territorial state” (91), “early modern state” (92), “sovereign state” (92, 113), “the new monarchies” (98), “Renaissance monarch[ies]” (105) interchangeably. His focus is not the distracting or simplistic one of dynasties, but rather, the appropriate one of state *structures*, which, he writes, “were sufficiently novel to mark a new period in the history of European political institutions” (106).
2. On mutinies, see the model essay by Geoffrey Parker, “Mutiny and Discontent in the Army of Flanders, 1572-1609,” *Past and Present*, LVIII (1973): 38-52; on bureaucracy, Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1965), *passim*; Michael Herzfeld, *The Social Production of Indifference* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992); R. Burr Litchfield, *Emergence of a Bureaucracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
3. Federico Chabod, “Was there a Renaissance State?” in *The Development of the Modern State*, ed. Heinz Lubasz (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 37.
4. For the debate on this important issue, see Elena Fasano Guarini, “Centro e periferia, accentramento e particolarismi: dicotomia o sostanza deli Stati in età moderna?” in *Origini dello Stato*, ed. Giorgio Chittolini, Anthony Molho, Pierangelo Schiera (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994), 147-176.
5. *Ibid.*, 37.
6. *Ibid.*, *passim*, and 37-40. Chabod’s sanguine assessment should be tempered by D. M. Bueno de Mesquita’s “Francesco Sforza and His Vassals,” in *Italian Renaissance Studies*, ed. E. F. Jacob, (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), 184-216, and “The Place of Despotism In Italian Politics,” in *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. J.R. Hale, J. R. L. Highfield and B. Smalley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 301-331.
7. AGS. *Estado*, leg. 1045, f. 292. Some summaries of the accounts sent to Spain before budgets were regularly compiled are in AGS. *Estado*, leg. 1027, ff. 71-78 (1529-1532). See also AGS. *Visitas de Italia*, leg. 20-8 and Nicola Barone, “Le cedole di Tesoreria dell’Archivio di Stato di Napoli dal 1460 al 1504,” *Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane* (1876, 1884).
8. AGS. *Estado*, leg. 1045, f. 292.
9. For some examples, see AGS. *Estado*, leg. 1008, f. 14: Alonso Sanchez signs a letter to Charles V as “Your Imperial and Catholic Majesty’s most humble servant and vassal, who kisses Your Imperial feet and hands” (22 September 1531); leg. 1009, n.f. (?): Hieronimo de Franco opens a letter to Charles V with “After humbly kissing your Imperial hands and feet” and signs it as “Your Sacred, Imperial and Catholic Majesty’s humble vassal and servant who kisses Your Imperial hands and feet” (27 July 1531).
10. ASN. *Sommaria. Consulte*, vol. 2, ff. 1r-4v (June 30, 1562).
11. AGS. *Secretarias Provinciales*, libro 44, f. 5r. At the end of the century, *Sommaria* accountants earned 300 ducats in salary and about 100 ducats in emoluments per year. On the long-term trend of administrative salaries and their relationship to prices, see Antonio Calabria, *The Cost of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 2002), 96, fig. 4.13.

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12. See in general, Marcel Mauss' very valuable *The Gift* (London: Cohen and West, 1970). For the "cheeses, hams and things to eat," see ASN. *Sommaria, Consulte*. Contemporary historians are oftentimes squeamish about the use of terms like "corruption" to describe some of the more egregious behavior of early modern officials (see for an example, Richard Bonney, ed., *Economic Systems and State Finance* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995], 233 and n. 4, which misses the point). Early modern governments themselves had no such compunctions.
13. AGS. *Visitas de Italia*, leg. 68.
14. AGS. *Visitas de Italia*, leg. 345/5 (# 142), 19 April 1563 (29 January 1558).
15. AGS. *Visitas de Italia*, leg. 11/5, f. 27v. The times given here are converted from the early modern "Italian" style of keeping track of time to the "French," or current. In the former style, based on a reading of the Old Testament, the day (and the first hour) would begin at sunset. On this issue, see Roberto Colzi, "Che ora era? Raffronto tra le ore all'italiana e alla francese a Roma," *Studi Romani XLIII*, 93-102.
16. AGS. *Visitas de Italia*, leg. 11/5, f. 27v.
17. Ibid.
18. AGS. *Visitas de Italia*, leg. 347/4.
19. BLL. Ms. Additional 20,924, f. 78r.
20. IVdDJ, envio 114/220 ("Del Patrimonio del Reyno de Napoles..."), no date.
21. Calabria, chs. 3-4, passim, and 134, 142.
22. IVdDJ, envio 114/220 ("Del Patrimonio Real del Reyno de Napoles..."), no date. Benavente was Viceroy in Naples from 1603 to 1610; Lemos, from 1610 to 1616. On Lemos and his reforms in Naples, see Giuseppe Galasso, *Mezzogiorno medievale e moderno* (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), 201 passim.
23. Jean-Claude Waquet, *Corruption* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), passim and 191-192.
24. Ibid., 192; see also AGS. *Secretarías Provinciales*, leg. 235, passim.
25. BCR. Ms. 2442, ff. 180r-199r.
26. See, in general on this issue, Federico Chabod *Lo Stato e la vita religiosa a Milano nell'epoca di Carlo V* (Turin: Einaudi, 1971), passim. See also Domenico Sella, *Crisis and Continuity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).
27. On Neapolitan finances in the early 1500s, see Tommaso Pedò, *Napoli e Spagna nella prima metà del Cinquecento* (Bari: F. Cacucci, 1971).
28. The data in this essay differ from those in text, where income is listed as 4,402,308 ducats (f. 187r) and expenses as 4,584,022 ducats (f. 196r). The difference is due to the fact that, for the sake of consistency, income and expense figures in this essay are net of 30,917 ducats, the operating expenses (*erbaggi*) for the Sheep Customhouse. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Calabria, 72, note 55.
29. "Various expenses," which included 15,000 ducats for the Royal stables, amounted to a relatively paltry sum, 30,860 ducats, or less than one percent of expenditure.
30. For just two examples from the early 1550s, see AGS. *Estado*, leg. 1042, f. 120 ("Relacion del donativo," 1549) and f. 135 (Bilanço y relacion del ultimo donativo hecho a S. M., 1552).
31. Giuseppe Galasso, "Contributo alla storia delle finanze del Regno di Napoli nella prima metà del Seicento," *Annuario dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per l'età moderna e contemporanea* 11 (1959): 5-106 (85, note v1), Professor Galasso's edition of the 1626 budget and the model for this essay.
32. BCR. Ms. 2442, ff. 183v, 181r, 182r, respectively, and ff. 197-198v.
33. Ibid., ff. 183v, 197r. For the other available figures for the early 1600s, see Calabria, 70, 134, 139. See also John Marino, *Pastoral Economics in the Kingdom of Naples* (Baltimore, 1988).
34. BCR. Ms. 2442, ff. 182r, 197r.
35. Ibid., ff. 181r, 197r.
36. Securities were offered at a given rate, for which the yield from a source of income represented the interest. On this system, see Calabria, 51-52, and the references at 49, note 73.
37. BCR. Ms. 2442, f. 197v.
38. Ibid., f. 186v.
39. Ibid., f. 184v.
40. Ibid., f. 184v.
41. See the graphs detailing that data (1550-1638) in Calabria, ch. 5.

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42. BNN. Ms. I-F-6, f. 35v [36v], and Galasso, *Mezzogiorno*, 213-214, note 11.
43. ASN. *Sommatoria. Consulte*, vol. 47, ff. 107r-126r (see also AGS. *Estado*, leg. 3267, f. 255).
44. Figure III rectifies an entry in Calabria, ch. 2, Figure 2.3 (52), which erroneously reports the loans for 1643 as 1,810,030 rather than 2,444,030 ducats.
45. BNN. Ms. XI-B-39, ff. 187r-215r.
46. BCR. Ms. 2442, f. 196v.
47. For some examples, see Calabria, 99-103, which reports some of those notices for the period 1564-1643.
48. See, for example, ASN. *Sommatoria, Consulte*, vol. 41, ff. 170r-189v [21 April 1638].
49. Giovanni Muto, *Saggi sul governo dell'economia nel Mezzogiorno spagnolo* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1992), 60.
50. For 1636, see ASN. *Sommatoria. Dipendenze. Nuova Numerazione*, fascio 28, ff. 30v-31r (6 September 1638).
51. BPUG. Collection Favre, vol. 46, ff. 126r-v, 132r-133r.
52. BLL. Ms. Additional 20,924, ff. 274r-279r.
53. BPUG. Collection Favre, vol. 50, ff. 50r-51v.
54. *Ibid.*, vol. 46, ff. 126r-v, 12 June 1672.
55. *Ibid.*, ff. 132r-133r.
56. *Ibid.*, f. 132v.
57. *Ibid.*, f. 159r, 15 June 1672.
58. *Ibid.*, ff. 165r-166r, 27 June 1672.
59. Coniglio, *Il Vicereame*, 307.
60. *Ibid.*, 307.
61. *Ibid.*, 306.
62. The quote is from D. M. Bueno de Mesquita, “The Place of Despotism,” 321; for the rest of the sentence see the same author’s “Ludovico Sforza and his Vassals.”
63. A current in Neapolitan studies has attempted to validate the role of the bureaucratic elite in the alleged formation of civil society in Naples. This essay has a different intent from such works.

